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Zusammenfassung 
Großereignisse (Mega-Events) finden zunehmend in Städten des Globalen Südens statt. Für die sozio-ökonomisch 
hochgradig fragmentierten Gastgeberstädte bringen diese Spektakel extreme Veränderungsprozesse mit sich. Dieser 
Artikel behandelt die Festivalisierung Rio de Janeiros in der Vorbereitungsphase der Fußballweltmeisterschaft 2014 
und der Olympischen Sommerspiele 2016 in Bezug auf die Stadtpolitik der Stadtverwaltung Rios im Umgang mit den 
Favelas. Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die aktuellen Maßnahmen der ‚Invisibilisation‘, ‚Befriedung‘, ‚Aufhübschung‘ und 
‚touristischen Inszenierung‘ der Favelas vor dem Hintergrund der bevorstehenden Events kritisch zu beleuchten.
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Abstract
Mega-events are increasingly often taking place in countries of the Global South. In the socio-spatially deeply fragmented 
host cities these spectacles encompass extremely transformative urban processes. This paper will consider the festivalisa-
tion of Rio de Janeiro in the preparatory phase of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. It focuses on the 
urban policy in relation to how Rio deals with its favelas. The aim of the article is to critically assess current measures of 
‘invisibilisation’, ‘pacification’, ‘beautification’ and ‘touristic staging’ of favelas against the backdrop of the upcoming events.
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1.  Introduction
Two parallel trends are currently discernible in con-
nection with mega-events: Firstly, these events are 
becoming increasingly gigantic in terms of gener-
ated profits, organisational effort and infrastruc-
tural investments, and secondly, they are more and 
more often taking place in countries in the so-called 
Global South. Especially applicants from ‘emerging 
nations’ are becoming increasingly successful in ap-
plying to host large-scale international events. For 
example, in 2010 alone, the Commonwealth Games, 
the EXPO and FIFA World Cup took place in New 
 Delhi (India), in Shanghai (China) and in South Af-
rica, respectively. In 2014 the FIFA World Cup will 
draw global attention to Brazil’s cities. More over, 
in 2009, Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the 2016 
Summer Olympics. The economies of all these coun-
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tries have registered enormous growth rates in the 
recent past, but at the same time, they are character-
ised by grave internal socio-economic disparities.
Sporting mega-events in the Global South have still 
received relatively little attention from urban geogra-
phers, yet they involve extremely transformative urban 
processes in the socio-spatial deeply fragmented host 
cities (Greene 2003, Matheson and Baade 2004, Horne 
and Manzenreiter 2006, Pillay et al. 2009,  Silvestre 
2008, Ley et al. 2010, Gaffney 2010, Curi et al. 2011). 
Given the complexities of mega-events, this paper 
will focus on urban policy relating to how host cities 
in the Global South deal with poverty-stricken areas 
(‘slums’) in the preparatory phase of mega-events. 
The article is divided into two parts. To set a frame, 
the first part will give brief general insights into the 
politico-economic event logic. Drawing on the con-
cept of ‘festivalisation’ of the two German sociolo-gists Hartmut Häußermann and Walter Siebel (1993), 
I will argue that slums represent an image problem. 
So far, experiences with previous mega-events in 
countries of the South have shown that the conven-
tional policy strategy is demolition and eviction. 
In the second part I will look into Rio’s festivalisation 
policy. How does Rio tackle its ‘staging problem’ of 
over 750 favelas? I will show that urban policy in Rio 
not only draws upon the conventional strategies, but 
supplements these strategies with more ‘innovative’ 
measures. Drawing on general ideas of ‘urban semiot-
ics’ (Gottdiener and Lagopoulos 1986) this paper spe-
cifically focuses on those policy interventions which 
aim to manipulate the sign ‘favela’ by transforming 
it in terms of a positive change of favela semantics. A 
simple heuristic is introduced and current measures 
of ‘invisibilisation’, ‘pacification’, ‘beautification’ and 
‘touristic staging’ of favelas are discussed against the 
backdrop of the upcoming events. 
This article is about the festivalisation of the favela, 
the ‘festifavelisation’ in Rio de Janeiro.
2.  Festivalisation in the Global South
2.1  Staging the city
The logic behind the application and selection pro-
cedures as well as the staging of a mega-event can 
only be understood if we consider its economic and 
political significance on a global scale: Mega-events 
are both profoundly commercial and highly politi-
cal. The entanglement of these two spheres (politics 
and economy) is constituent of the processes sur-
rounding the event and highly influential on the ur-
ban development dynamics initiated or stimulated 
by the event (Steinbrink et al. 2011).
The powerful international sporting federations FIFA 
and IOC have been global players for a long time now; 
as such, they are primarily economic actors operating 
in accordance with market principles. As the owners 
and content providers of the largest mega-events, their 
decisions on venues are essentially profit-oriented. The 
right to host these events is, quite literally, auctioned; 
the fact that the application documents submitted by 
national associations are called ‘bid books’ is not with-
out its reasons. Bid books explain in detail what the 
potential host countries have to offer in exchange for 
being selected. As franchisees, the applicant countries 
have to ensure commercial success for IOC and FIFA. 
This means that, among other things, the games have 
to be held in top-class stadiums with sufficient capacity 
for spectators (including VIP lounges etc.). Moreover, 
excellent transport connections and sufficient accom-
modation of adequate standard have to be available for 
(international) visitors. On top of this, an optimum of 
international media coverage has to be guaranteed so 
that commercially effective images of happiness and 
heroism can be sent out to the world. Of course, reports 
on incidents of crime as, for instance, in the run-up to 
the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (cf. Korth and Rolfes 
2010) or reports about violence in the metropolises of 
Brazil (cf. Pellacini 2011), do not fit in here. Since fans, 
journalists and teams need to feel comfortable during 
the tournaments, the question of public safety stands 
out as a further central concern of FIFA and IOC.
With regard to securing the smooth course of events, 
both FIFA and IOC have developed a comprehensive 
catalogue of obligatory requirements addressed to po-
tential hosts. Their fulfilment must be guaranteed by 
the host governments. The very fact that governments 
willingly grant FIFA and IOC the right to exercise far-
reaching political influence is a clear indication of 
the huge political interest that the governments of 
the host countries associate with the staging of these 
events (cf. e.g. Steinbrink et al. 2011). In the case of 
applications from so-called ‘emerging’ or ‘threshold’ 
countries, the symbolic enhancement of the national 
profile in particular plays an important role in regard 
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to ‘foreign policy’. There is the hope that successfully 
staging a mega-event will help shake off the stigma of 
‘underdevelopment’ and will thus enable the country 
to cross the ‘threshold’ to the circle of leading indus-
trial nations (Greene 2003, Ley et al. 2010). 
The applicants also cherish hopes with regard to 
‘domestic policy’. Beside the argument of economic 
growth, which is constantly put forward in the run-
up to events (foreign direct investment, promotion 
of tourism etc.; cf. e.g. Whitson and Macintosh 1996; 
Hiller 2000; Burton 2003, Maennig and Schwarthoff 
2010), the function of sport as a generator of a sense of 
belonging – in terms of a national ‘feel-good effect’ – 
must be mentioned here as well (Cornelissen 2012). 
At the level of urban policy, globalisation processes, 
neo-liberal economic policies and the global competi-
tion between metropolises, in particular, are consid-
ered the driving forces behind the growing impor-
tance of mega-events (cf. Sassen 2001; Harvey 1989; 
Greene 2003). Taking a look at Europe and the USA this 
process can be placed in the context of de-industrial-
isation. In an effort to parry the threatening decline, 
David Harvey (1989) notes, the post-industrial cities 
are hardly left with anything but asserting themselves 
as international finance, consumption or entertain-
ment centres (cf. Roche 1994, Hoffman et al. 2003). 
Yet the metropolises of the South are also out to po-
sition themselves on the global market. In both cases, 
mega-events are becoming instruments of global city 
marketing and image-building in the competition for 
investment capital between the ‘world class cities’ (cf. 
Burbank et al. 2001; Bittner 2001; Greene 2003; Shin 
2009; Steinbrink et al. 2011). The current mega-event 
trend in countries of the South can therefore be inter-
preted as the ‘globalisation of festivalisation’.
With regard to the objectives of festivalisation poli-
cies, Häußermann et al. (2008: 263f.) propose a dis-
tinction between (1) the outwardly directed goal of 
image production for international recognition, and 
(2) the inwardly directed goal of initiating, legiti-
mising and promoting certain urban development 
 dynamics or large-scale projects. The mega-event, 
then, is intended to serve both as growth engine and 
transmission belt for urban redevelopment.
In the course of the preparation of events, the national 
ambitions of the host countries and the urban politi-
cal interests of the host cities blend together with the 
profit objectives of FIFA and IOC as well as their busi-
ness partners. The amalgamation of these interests 
constitutes the common goal of the events’ success – 
whereby ‘success’, most notably, means successful 
staging of the event (cf. Haferburg and Steinbrink 2010).
In the run-up to a mega-event, the rigorous time frame 
puts politicians and planners under enormous pres-
sure, which strongly affects urban development. This 
almost inevitably leads to a concentration of urban 
policy regarding spatial distribution and content and 
to an acceleration of the implementation of selected 
(prestigious) projects. Despite the mantra-like ‘legacy 
and sustainability’ rhetoric – i.e. the reference to long-
term positive effects (for all) – in the bid books and in 
political speeches (cf. Rio 2016 Candidate City; Reeves 
2009), the actual priority in this phase is primarily 
orientated towards (short-term) global staging and 
‘neo-liberal dreamworlds’ (Davis and Monk 2007) and 
not to the objectives of socially integrative city devel-
opment. Consequently, the main target groups of this 
festivalisation policy are not the residents and espe-
cially not the urban poor but the billions of global TV 
viewers and the international visitors on the one hand 
and the investors on the other hand.
2.2 Visible backstage
The preparation of events in the Global South leads to 
a conflict between image objectives in the context of 
global competition on the one hand and the needs of 
urban citizens, most of whom are economically weak, 
on the other hand. Tensions are particularly evident 
in the political treatment of urban poverty areas. The 
densely populated cities are characterised by poverty 
and immense socio-economic disparities. The spatial 
structures of the cities are correspondingly fragment-
ed. A large part of the urban populations – especially 
the lowest income groups – live in informal dwellings 
on the city outskirts and on residual urban land. The 
urban poor often live in settlements that are describ-
able as ‘slums’ (UN-Habitat 2003: 11) and that gener-
ally do not comply with the right to adequate hous-
ing as defined in the UN Charter for Human Rights (cf. 
United Nations General Assembly 1948). 
It is well known that the spread of urban poverty and 
the living conditions of the worldwide one billion slum 
dwellers represent one of the greatest humanitarian 
challenges of our time (cf. e.g. Davis 2006). But within 
the logic of mega-events, the host cities’ ‘slum prob-
lem’ is a very different one: To begin with, slums are 
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sometimes located in places labelled for developments 
relevant to the events (stadiums, roads etc.); secondly, 
slums conflict with the cities’ image-building efforts. 
Governments, city administrations and organising 
committees often perceive these settlements as ‘eye-
sores’. Slums therefore pose an obstacle to city staging. 
With regard to festivalisation policies in countries of 
the Global North, Häußermann et al. (2008: 265) state:
“Since large-scale events primarily aim at showcas-
ing a visible image of the city internationally, there 
is the inevitable tendency, in mega-event policies, 
to actually consider everything that is invisible as 
unimportant, too. This, of course, includes the many 
social problems that cannot be integrated into a 
positive image” [author’s translation].
In cities of the Global South it is indeed hardly pos-
sible to overlook the social problems of poverty and 
inequality since they are clearly visible in the form of 
informal settlements. Hence the host cities are com-
pelled to cope with these visible problems, or rather 
with the problem of their visibility (Steinbrink et al. 
2011). There is no room for strategies of sustainable 
settlement development, firstly because of the con-
densed timeframe typical of such events, and second-
ly because the limited financial resources flow into 
other event-related investments. As a result, cheaper 
short-term measures are preferred: ‘visual protec-
tion screens’ such as fences and walls, as well as the 
demolition of settlements and forced evictions. The 
more visible a slum is for the media and the interna-
tional public, the higher the probability of such inter-
ventions. The most affected settlements are near city 
centres or important event venues, next to airports 
or along important roads connecting the venues (cf. 
Greene 2003, Newton 2009).
Prior to the 1988 summer Olympics in Seoul (South 
Korea), 720,000 people were forcefully relocated; in 
the run-up to the 2010 EXPO exhibition in Shanghai 
(China), the relocation of 400,000 people was an-
nounced; and New Delhi (India) was supposed to be 
‘slum-free’ by the opening day of the Commonwealth 
Games in 2010; and so between 2003 and 2006, as 
many as 300,000 slum inhabitants were evicted (cf. 
COHRE 2007). The relocation measures attained a 
new dimension prior to the Olympic Games in Bei-
jing: According to estimates, roughly 1.5 million 
people were affected by evictions between 2000 and 
2008 (cf. Shin 2009). These figures illustrate how 
much importance the host cities attach to the need 
to manage the ‘slum as a staging problem’, and they 
are also indicative of the usual modus operandi.
3.  Festifavelisation in Rio de Janeiro
For nearly ten years now, Brazil – especially Rio de 
 Janeiro – has strongly been hedging its bets on the 
urban policy of festivalisation. This is reflected in 
the list of sporting mega-events taking place there: 
Pan American Games (2007), World Military Games 
(2011), FIFA Confederations Cup (2013), FIFA World 
Cup (2014), Summer Olympic Games and Paralym-
pics (2016), as well as Copa America (2019). Further, 
large-scale political, religious and/or cultural events 
such as the RIO+20 Conference (2012) and the World 
Youth Day (2013) took place here.
The world’s eyes are upon Brazil now, which, under its 
former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has evolved 
into a major economic world power. And Rio will be 
its main stage on which the new, strong Brazil is to 
present itself to the world public. For Rio de Janeiro, 
this is a special opportunity after having experienced 
a substantial decline in importance since 1960 when 
Brasília had become the new federal capital. Com-
pared particularly to São Paulo, which has steadily 
grown into Latin America’s biggest economic centre 
in the past decades, Rio has continuously been lagging 
behind. The up-coming mega-events are perceived as 
a great opportunity to push forward urban redevelop-
ment and infrastructural projects in order to reposi-
tion the city both nationally and globally.
But Rio de Janeiro has a ‘slum problem’, too: Just as in 
other major Brazilian cities, the immense social dis-
parities in Rio find expression in an extremely frac-
tured urban structure (cf. Lopes de Souza 1993, Coy 
2006; Borsdorf and Coy 2009; Wehrhahn 2009; Deff-
ner 2010; Perlman 2010; Lanz 2012, Rothfuß 2012). 
Approximately every sixth inhabitant lives in one 
of the city’s over 750 favelas (IBGE 2010). Because 
of the tense situation on the formal housing market 
and due to the insufficiency of public housing pro-
grammes, the informal residential areas have long 
represented the only affordable choice for the poor 
in Rio. Ever since the emergence of the first favelas 
more than a hundred years ago, they have largely 
been neglected by the city administration. Apart 
from some limited measures in the run-up to elec-
tions and from occasional interventions in the form 
of resettlements or police and military repressions, 
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the government has largely ignored its urban poverty 
areas (cf. Lanz 2004; Wacquant 2005; Penglase 2009). 
The problem of violent crime first emerged in the pub-
lic consciousness in the early 1980s during the tran-
sitional phase from military dictatorship to electoral 
democracy (Caldeira and Holston 1999; Piquet Carnei-
ro 2000; Aziz and Alves 2003). Drug gangs began to fill 
the power gap in the socially and politically margin-
alised parts of the city (Lanz 2004; Wacquant 2005; 
Lopes de Souza 2008; Deffner 2013). Based on hierar-
chically organised mafia-like structures and strongly 
influenced by drug-trafficking businesses, armed 
violence and terror, these criminal syndicates control 
most of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The traffickers 
have thus become a parallel power with its own rules 
(‘law of the hillside’, Penglase 2009: 49), to which the 
inhabitants of the favelas have to submit. The syndi-
cates became so powerful and so heavily equipped 
with arms that they were capable of preventing or 
controlling any state interference in ‘their’ territories. 
The police could only gain access to the settlements 
by armed force or in consultation with the drug lords; 
even social projects and public infrastructural meas-
ures could only be implemented through negotiations 
with the respective gangs (cf. Lopes de Souza 2004, 
Arias 2006). This additionally enhanced the govern-
ment’s neglect of the favelas and led to further mar-
ginalisation and stigmatisation of their inhabitants. 
At the same time, it contributed to the fact that rents 
and house prices in the favelas remained relatively 
unaffected by the dramatic price increases on the 
formal real estate market. Even in centrally located 
favelas, the price of housing is still comparatively low 
(cf. Frischtak and Mandel 2012). To a certain extent the 
favelas have remained outside the sphere of economic 
valorisation of the formal land and real estate market.
Most of Rio’s informal settlements are located in its 
western part or in the Northern Zone (Zona Norte), 
far from the city centre and from the economically 
flourishing Southern Zone (Zona Sul) with its popular 
Copacabana, Leblon and Ipanema beaches. However, 
there are numerous favelas in these parts of the city 
as well, and they shape Rio’s cityscape since they are 
built on the steep mountain slopes and partly border 
the most expensive residential areas. These favelas 
are by no means Rio’s poorest areas with the worst 
living conditions, but it is precisely these that repre-
sent the biggest planning problem in the context of 
the mega-events: Firstly, some of them are located in 
areas that have been chosen for infrastructure pro-
jects relevant to the events (e.g. the construction of 
roads connecting important event venues); secondly, 
these centrally located favelas pose an aesthetic stag-
ing problem. Due to their exposed locations, they are 
very visible on the city’s front stage, and their ap-
pearance is difficult to reconcile with the striven-for 
world-class city image. Due to their dense and appar-
ently chaotic building structures, the favelas rather 
emblematically stand for attributes (poverty, bad 
governance, social stratification etc.) the elimination 
of which is meant to be presented to the world.
The pressure to tackle this staging problem is intensi-
fied by international media reports on the crime situ-
ation in Rio de Janeiro. Besides scepticism regarding 
the infrastructural preparations (e.g. the construc-
tion of roads and stadiums), there are serious concerns 
about the high crime rates in Rio. The mass-media 
discourse on the issue constructs a spatial semantic 
link between crime and the favela; there is hardly a re-
port on the safety situation in Rio that does not locate 
crime in the favelas. Successful film productions such as City of God (2003) and Tropa de Elite (2007) further 
contribute to this discourse: Favelas are portrayed as 
uncontrollable and dangerous places in which drug-re-
lated crimes, violence and lawlessness are the prevail-
ing features. In media discourses favelas are the quasi-
spatial bearer of the image of an ‘insecure Brazil’. From 
the viewpoint of the organisers of the event, however, 
it is precisely the journalists’ and international guests’ 
feeling of security that is crucial for the success of the 
event. The planners and policy-makers therefore feel 
the urgency to deal with this globally transmitted 
‘favela problem’ (as Rio’s security problem No. 1).
3.1  Tackling ‘the favela’
In recent years the City of Rio de Janeiro has been 
remarkably active in the implementation of various 
measures concerning the favelas. It seems reasonable 
to see this increased activity in the light of the upcom-
ing mega-events: The favelas represent an urgent im-
age issue that needs to be tackled before the event. 
In compliance with the general idea of ‘urban se-
miotics’ (Gottdiener and Lagopoulos 1986; Lagopou-
los 2009) this staging problem can be interpreted 
against the backdrop of the specific semiotic nature 
of the ‘favela’. Under the event logic, the sign ’favela’ 
has two problematic aspects: The first is the high vis-
ibility of the (material) signifier – i.e. the large num-
Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging – the example of Rio de Janeiro
134 DIE ERDE · Vol. 144 · 2/2013
Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging – the example of Rio de Janeiro
ber of favelas, central and exposed locations of some 
favelas, and their broad presence in the media. The 
second problematic aspect is the specific significa-
tion, i.e. the semantic charging with negative ascrip-
tions such as ‘poverty’, ‘crime’, ‘bad governance’ etc.
Basing on this notion, the various observable urban 
policy measures can be interpreted as semiotic inter-
ventions, as governmental attempts to interfere with 
the signifying character of the favela, and can hence 
be assigned to the two problematic aspects men-
tioned above. Accordingly, two types of strategic in-
terventions can be distinguished: (1) invisibilisation 
and (2) transformation of the sign ‘favela’.
Along with this simple heuristic (Fig. 1) this article 
elucidates the governmental measures to ‘tackle the 
favela’ and interprets them within the context of 
Rio’s festivalisation policy. The following sections 
are structured accordingly.
3.2  Intervention type I: invisibilisation 
This first type of strategic intervention represents the 
conventional method to approach the slum as a stag-
ing problem in the context of mega-events in the Global 
South (see above); it aims to render the favela (signifier) 
‘invisible’. Different urban policy measures of this type 
could be observed in Rio de Janeiro in recent years.
3.2.1  Demolition and eviction
The coarsest form of invisibilisation strategy is the 
forced removal of inhabitants – mostly to the remote 
outskirts of the city – and the demolition of the build-
ings. Extensive eviction measures had already been 
taken in the period prior to the 2007 Pan-American 
games; and relocations of ‘less advantaged communi-
ties’ were also mentioned in the Olympic bid book (Rio 
2016 Candidate City 2009, Vol. 2: 145). In 2009, Rio’s 
municipal government published a list of 119 favelas 
to be partly or fully removed before 2016 (cf. Gaffney 
2010, Silvestre and Gusmão de Oliveira 2012). How-
ever, in most cases the official rhetoric doesn’t link 
the announced relocations to the approaching events; 
instead, the settlements are often said to be threat-
ened by the environment (landslides, floods etc.) or 
presented as a threat to the environment (extension 
of settlements to forest conservation areas).
3.2.2  Walls
The argument of environmental preservation was also 
used by Governor Sergio Cabral and Mayor  Edu ardo 
Paes to justify a programme for the erection of walls 
(‘eco limites’ to protect the Atlantic forest), 3 meters 
high, around 19 favelas in Zona Sul, for a total of 11 
kilometres long and encompassing 550 removed fami-
lies. This programme started in 2009 and was heav-
Fig. 1 ‘Favela’ as a problematic 
sign and urban- policy 
interventions in the con-
text of  mega-events – a 
 heuristic model
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ily criticised in the international media (Minoja 2010: 
128f.). The first favela to be enclosed by walls was 
Santa Marta (Turcheti e Melo 2010). This measure, 
which costs approximately US$ 18 million, and which 
was financed by the State Fund of Environmental Con-
servation (Fecam), can well be considered part of the 
invisibilisation strategy, for walls are not only erected 
along forest fringes, but also along connecting roads 
that are important for the events. Although the latter 
are officially justified as noise protection measures, 
the assumption that they are ‘sociolimits’ (Turcheti e 
Melo 2010: 22ff.) primarily intended to serve as sight 
and image protection seems  reasonable. 
3.2.3  Visual media representation
Another form of invisibilising the favela refers to the 
manipulation of the visual representation of the host 
city in the media: The City of Rio is making a remarka-
ble effort to ensure that the favelas are left out of official 
promotion photos and advertising videos. It is notice-
able, for instance, that pictures of the famous Maracanã 
Stadium are always taken from an angle that prevents 
the bordering Manguiera favela from coming into view. 
Rio’s official Olympic bid video also features a comput-
er-animated flyover on which not a single favela can be 
spotted; favelas were simply erased (http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=QBTyx4ie3hQ, 14/06/2012).
It is also remarkable that the term ‘favela’ does 
not even appear once in the three volumes of Rio’s 
419-paged Olympic bid book (cf. Rio 2016 Candidate 
City 2009); here and in other official documents the 
political correct alternative term ‘communidade’ 
(‘community‘) is used in its stead. This official lan-
guage policy, too, can be interpreted as an attempt 
of (textual) invisibilisatiof the  favela. 
Furthermore, favelas are also left out on the official 
tourist map (RioTur); instead the areas are mostly in-
dicated as green spaces. In this context, there was also 
a conflict between the City of Rio and Google Maps in 
2011. The city complained that the online maps pro-
vided by the free cartographic service had presented 
the favelas too prominently and had highlighted com-
paratively little of Rio’s tourist attractions (Fig. 2).
Antonio Figueira de Mello, a spokesperson of Rio’s 
tourism authorities, described the maps as absurd, 
commenting that they created the impression that the 
host city was an ‘immense agglomeration of favelas’ (Antunes 2011). The city, fearing that it might suf-
fer damage to its image, requested that the maps 
be changed. In 2013 Google complied with Rio’s de-
mands and amended the cartographic representa-
tions accordingly. Today the term ‘favela’ no longer 
appears on the online maps and the areas are indi-
cated as green spaces. Figure 3 shows the satellite 
image of the favela Cantagalo-Pavão-Pavãozinho 
(approx. 10,000 inhabitants) and the cartographic 
invisibilisation on Google Maps in 2013.
Fig. 2  Visible favelas on Google Maps (2011)
Fig. 3 Cartographic invisibilisation of the favela 
(Source: Google 2013)
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3.3  Intervention type II: transformations
The second type of intervention represents a more 
innovative urban-policy strategy applied in an ef-
fort to deal with the favela as a ‘problematic sign’ 
and ‘staging obstacle’. It relates to the practice of in-
terpretation and sense-making. This involves firstly 
governmental attempts to improve the image of the 
state with regard to how it deals with the favelas 
and their inhabitants, and secondly the attempts 
to actively transform the favela image. Against this 
background different measures of intervention in 
the favelas can be interpreted as parts of a three-
step strategy of semiotic favela transformation: (1) preparation, (2) remodeling and (3) staging (Fig. 1).
3.3.1  Step 1: preparation by ‘pacification’
Shortly after the announcement of FIFA’s choice of Bra-
zil as the host of the 2014 World Cup tournament, the 
government started a large-scale programme for the 
‘pacification’ of favelas in Rio. The declared goal of the 
campaign is to improve the general security situation 
in Rio, as well as to create a precondition for social pro-
jects and infrastructural measures in the settlements.
The first step consists in the massive deployment 
of BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais: 
Special Police Operations Battalion), a special mili-
tary police unit of Rio de Janeiro State. The invasions 
carried out by these notorious special forces intend 
to  expel, arrest or kill members of drug gangs and 
to occupy the favelas. In the second step, police sta-
tions of UPP (Unidade de Policía Pacificadora), Rio’s 
‘pacifying police unit’, are set up in the favelas. The 
newly established and specially trained UPP police 
units are to act as ‘community police’ and to make 
sure that these areas permanently remain free from 
drug trafficking and armed violence. Their official 
task is to act as regulators and helpers in the com-
munities, to establish communication and interac-
tion with the residents and to promote the overall 
acceptance of police presence in the favelas.
So far, 30 UPP police stations have been set up (cf. UPP 
Social 2013); and the two largest favelas, Complexo 
do Alemão and Rocinha, were also occupied in prepa-
ration for the stationing of UPPs. Altogether, the au-
thorities plan to pacify forty favelas before the FIFA 
World Cup in 2014, and one hundred until the Summer 
Olympics in 2016 (Freeman 2012; Gaffney 2010).
This timetable and the initiation date of the pro-
gramme clearly indicate that the UPP programme, de-
spite official comments to the contrary, is primarily a 
security programme for the coming mega-events. The 
programme is by no means a city-wide measure; it is 
confined to selected favelas, and they are not necessar-
ily those with the highest crime rates (cf. Frischtak and 
Mandel 2012: 8), but those located in city areas, which 
are strategically relevant to the events. This and the 
fact that the UPP programme is financially supported 
by international concerns such as Coca Cola – a major 
sponsor of the IOC and FIFA – and Brazilian oil mag-nate Eike Batista (Barrionuevo 2010) suggest that it is 
not the inhabitants of the respective favelas who are 
the primary beneficiaries of the pacification efforts.
Photo 1 Staging of the clenched fist of the state – BOPE 
snipers and journalists during the occupation of 
the Rocinha favela (Source: AFP)
Photo 2  Sign of the victory of ‘Ordem e Progresso’– BOPE 
forces hoisting the Brazilian flag after the occu-
pation of the Complexo do Alemão (Source: AFP)
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The recent favela pacification is a means in the at-
tempt to fulfill the requirements of FIFA and IOC re-
garding the safety of international visitors. With this 
ambitious programme, the state is demonstrating 
its political power and capacity in matters of public 
security. Accordingly, the state is placing its actions 
on the media stage. And the media actually do take 
notice: The Choque de Paz (shock of peace) operation 
for the pacification of Rocinha, a large-scale opera-
tion involving over 3000 storm-troopers in Novem-
ber 2011, developed into a large-scale media event. 
There were about as many international reporters 
on the scene as were police and military forces; one 
could have gotten the impression that press photo-
graphers were in trouble to find motifs unspoiled by 
a colleague’s telephoto. With helicopters, tanks and 
special forces of the Tropa de Elite (BOPE) dressed 
in black combat suits with the martial skull-emblem, 
the operation looked like an elaborate PR spectacle: 
Rocinha as an arena for a media circus in which the 
state was putting the firm hand of its power on dis-
play (Photo 1). The government forces hoisted the 
Brazilian flag at the highest point of the settlement – 
a symbol of victory which had also been used dur-
ing the occupation of the Complexo do Alemão – for 
a  media-effective climax. The intended message is 
clear: The state is now taking care of Ordem e Pro-
gresso (order and progress) in the favelas (Photo 2).
However, it is not only the clenched fist of the state 
that is put on display; its helping and protective hand 
is also stage-managed skillfully. The UPP profession-
ally manages its media image; it runs its own press 
office as well as a well-maintained website entitled 
UPP Repórter – Embrace this idea (www.upprj.com), 
which provides information on current develop-
ments – in English, too! In addition, UPP police offic-
ers are trained in media relations. Journalists, social 
scientists and foreign delegations are welcome to visit 
UPP stations, where they are supplied with informa-
tion (on the programme’s achievements). This inten-
sive public-relations work has given rise to the pre-
dominantly positive news reports. In the media, UPP 
police officers are presented as close to the commu-
nity, helpful and friendly. One key visual motif is that 
of officers posing with children – often displaying a 
tender and caring physical contact (cf. Photo 3 and 
Photo 4). In the Santa Marta favela, the author wit-
nessed the following scene: a male tourist (approx. 50 
years old) asked a UPP officer for permission to pho-
tograph him. The officer kindly accepted and spon-
taneously grabbed an approx. 6-year-old boy for a 
(kneeling and smiling) pose with him for the camera: 
coincidence or part of the public-relations campaign?
The favela pacification is obviously a political reac-
tion to the representation of the ‘favela problem’ in 
the international media. The UPP programme is an 
integral part of strategic city-staging. It is part of a 
campaign with which the host city seeks to media-
effectively demonstrate its capacity in terms of secu-
rity policy in order to improve its security image1.
But this programme is not only an expression of the 
effort to change the media-assigned role of the state 
(‘The state is doing something!’); the pacifications 
also create certain preconditions for a change in the 
globally communicated image of the favela itself. The 
progamme can be seen as a first step of the host city’s 
strategy to transform the sign ‘favela’ by actively 
influencing the signification and interpretation in 
a way that makes it possible to integrate the favela 
in the sugar-loaf-sweetened and samba-saturated 
event-image of the ‘marvelous city’. 
3.3.2  Step 2: Aesthetic remodeling (‘beautification’)
This strategy relates to acts of interference into the 
materiality of the signifier. Some elements of the sign 
‘favela’ are deleted, changed or added with the aim of 
suggesting other – more positive – ascriptions or in-
terpretations. Many of the massive construction and 
infrastructural activities in the pacified favelas can 
serve as examples for this aesthetic remodeling. In 
public speeches, these measures are presented as pro-
jects designed for the betterment of the local living 
conditions; a closer look, however, reveals that many 
of the developments are largely intended to improve 
the outward appearance of the favelas or are particu-
larly orientated towards the needs of visitors. 
For example, in the pacified Favela Mangueira, which 
is located next to the Maracanã Stadium, a cable car is 
installed, a samba school designed by star architect 
Oscar Niemeyer is erected, and public places are taste-
fully redesigned. As a result of these beautifications, 
many houses in Mangueira have to be demolished and 
their inhabitants displaced. 
In the case of Morro da Providência Favela, which was 
pacified in March 2010, it is also obvious that many of 
the construction measures mainly serve the purpose 
of ‘symbolic taming’ (Freeman 2012). The settlement, 
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which counts roughly 5,500 inhabitants, is considered 
Rio’s oldest favela. It is situated on a steep hill not far 
from the old port. The port area (Porto Maravilha) will 
be completely newly developed and revitalised for the 
Olympic Games; it is the most lavish and cost-intensive 
urban-development project (Gaffney 2010). The meas-
ures in Providência that are planned on the social 
investment programmes PAC and Morar Carioca also 
include a cable car system. Freeman (2012) expresses 
the presumption that this system is actually designed 
in such a way that it purposely sacrifices many houses 
to the bulldozer (‘thinning out’). Eight hundred resi-
dential units have already been labelled for demoli-
tion. These measures gave rise to massive protests; 
residents tried to block the construction works, but 
were prevented from doing so by UPP units. The pro-
testers complained that the building project worth 
several millions did not at all meet their most urgent 
needs (e.g. education, jobs, health care). Their slogan, 
‘teleférico para quem?’ (‘cable car for whom?’), seems 
reasonable if one considers the lay-out of the cable car 
system: One of the lines will lead to the central station 
(Central do Brasil), another one directly to the Cidade 
do Samba, where the floats for the yearly carnival pro-
cessions are built and which is also one of Rio’s most 
popular tourist attractions. Moreover, there is a plan 
for a line to the new cruise docks, where the ‘Museum 
of Tomorrow’ is built as a prestige object and tourist 
magnet. The cable car will go to Cruzeiro, Providên-
cia’s highest point, which provides a fabulous pano-
rama view. All the houses in this area have already 
been earmarked for demolition. According to a report in O Globo (Brazil’s biggest daily paper) of 29 March 
2010, there are plans to replace these dwellings with 
new colonial-style buildings designated for commer-
cial and residential functions. Moreover, there are 
plans for a ‘favela museum’, which is to be devoted to 
the history of Providência (Menezes 2012: 121). The 
question here, too, is: para quem? (‘for whom?’)
A further example is the Cantagalo-Pavão-Pavãozinho 
complex, which used to be infamous for its high homi-
cidal rates. The favela is located near some particular-
ly popular residential areas at the boundary between 
Ipanema and Copacabana and is quite visible from the 
beach. The favela complex was pacified in late 2009. 
Before the pacification, construction work had already 
commenced on the new Ipanema metro station. An exit 
from the station was constructed on the site of a for-
mer entrance to the favela Cantagalo on junction R. Tei-
xeira de Melo/R. Barão da Torre. Until then, Ipanema’s 
middle-class inhabitants had considered this area ex-
tremely unsightly, dubious and  dangerous, mainly be-
cause of the disorderly appearance and the various – 
partly informal, partly illegal – business activities. A 
64-meter tower with a lift and a viewing platform for 
tourists (Mirante da Paz/‘view of peace’)2 constituted 
a central element of the Complexo Rubem  Braga build-
ing project (costs: BLR 48 million/roughly US$ 24 mil-
lion); it also features a modern bridge construction 
connecting the tower with the favela. Although it was 
claimed that the tower was designed to improve the 
accessibility of the settlement, this oversized building 
might rather be serving the purpose of remodelling an 
infamous part of Ipanema so as to meet the aesthetic 
requirements of the middle class and the tourists. The 
favela entrance and the houses located there disap-
peared as a result of the construction project; they 
were replaced by the iconic architecture of the Com-
plexo Rubem Braga and by a clean, camera-monitored 
Photo 3 and 4 The helping and protective hand of the State – UPP police officers with favela children (Source: www.
upprj.com, 24/06/2012)
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square controlled by security staff. The hyper-modern 
building designed in blue and green and illuminated 
at night dominates the scenery; it also conceals large 
parts of the settlement when viewed from below.
Another form of remodelling favelas, which clearly 
aims at a positive change in outward appearance 
and is primarily orientated towards the ‘tourist 
gaze’ (Urry 2002), are the aesthetic interventions 
made on favela facades. For example, the City in-
vested a lot of money in paint in order to redesign 
the roadside structures in the lowest part of the 
well-known Favela Rocinha at the Estr. Lagua Barra 
in bright colours. Also along a major street within 
Rocinha (Rua 4) houses were revamped in this way. 
The bright and colourful design contrasts sharply 
with the usual appearance of the grey or unplas-
tered house fronts inside the favela.
The project, dubbed ‘Favela Painting’, conceived by 
the designer duo Jeroen Koolhaas and Dre Urhahn, rep-
resents a particularly impressive example of aesthet-
ic intervention. The Dutchmen designed the facades 
at the central square (Praça Cantão) at the entrance to 
the lower part of the first pacified favela Santa Mar-
ta. They remodeled the square into a comprehensive 
work of art. They hired people from the favela, who, 
after completing a brief course in painting and scaf-
folding, painted the house facades, following the ba-
sic pattern drafted by the artists. The outcome of this 
work is a colourfully bright ensemble (cf. Photo 5).
On their website (www.favelapainting.com), the de-
signers describe their work as follows: “About 7000 
square meters of hillside slum, converted into a new 
monument for the community.” This statement is 
remarkable since it suggests that the new design 
alone suffices to change this part of Santa Marta into 
something that is no longer a slum ─ not, however, 
into a ‘deslummed’ residential area, but into a (slum) 
monument. The second part of the statement is open 
to further interpretation: Does ‘monument for the 
community’ mean that the designers intended to set 
up a monument for the inhabitants (just like a memo-
rial for a deceased person whom one would like to 
remember in a certain way)? Or is the project really 
meant to give Santa Marta’s inhabitants aesthetic en-
joyment? The work of art is doubtlessly monumental, 
but again the question is: for whom? ‘for the commu-
nity’, as it  proclaimed, or ‘for the tourists’?3.
The new facade design in Rocinha and Santa Mar-
ta is unusual both for the favelas and for Rio as a 
whole; yet, the design is still compatible. In terms 
of choice of colour and pattern it meaningfully 
links up aesthetically to specific notions and imag-
es of the favela, which are particularly prevalent in 
the context of city tourism in Rio. The redesigned 
favela facades unequivocally invoke certain modes 
of representation and apply style elements which 
in fact are known from favela paintings that are of-
fered as souvenirs on the streets.
These pictures, often designed in a naïve, child-like 
style (cf. Fig. 4), reflect a favela image beyond misery, 
drug, crime and violence. Instead they draw on no-
tions of an exotic way of life which, though chaotic, is 
largely colourful, vibrant and happy ─ notions of ‘the 
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Photo 5  ‘Favela Painting’ in Santa Marta (Source: D. Urhahn, with permission of the artist)
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Fig.4   Examples of typical favela paintings
real exotic Brazil’. These souvenirs that reflect the 
exoticising elements of the favela image have become 
the aesthetic ideal for the new face of the favela, they 
function as templates for the new design.
The described examples of activities directed towards 
changing the outward appearance of the favela (be 
that by building or painting) can all be interpreted as 
an expression of a politically initiated facelift for the 
visitors’ eyes. The city is out to display favelas located 
in areas of strategic importance in a way that fits into 
the intended image of the event city. The intention is 
not to render these favelas invisible, rather prettier. 
The aim is to suggest other, more positive interpreta-
tions and thus to prepare them for touristic staging.
3.3.3  Step 3: touristic staging 
In addition to governmental attempts to achieve a 
transformation of the sign ‘favela’ by way of trans-
forming its materiality, the City of Rio has actively 
been making efforts to selectively direct the tour-
ist’s gaze and to inf luence the interpretation of the 
remodeled signifier. In the process, the city draws 
upon a trend in tourism which has been spreading 
in the Global South since the early 1990s: namely 
slum tourism, the touristic valorisation of urban 
poverty areas, which mostly takes place in the 
form of organised tours for visitors from the Global 
North (Steinbrink et al. 2012). 
In Rio de Janeiro, favela tourism – the Brazilian ver-
sion of slum tourism – emerged in the context of 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Sustainable Development (UNCED) in 1992. Favelas, 
already visible in the distance, drew the attention 
of representatives of NGOs, political activists and 
journalists, mainly because the police and military 
had cordoned them off during the conference, owing 
to security and image concerns. They therefore de-
manded guided tours of Rocinha, Rio’s largest favela (Freire-Medeiros 2009). In the center of attention was 
the situation of the socio-spatially marginalised ‘fave-
lados’ (Frenzel 2012: 52). From these first informally 
guided tours a commercial tourism branch developed 
in the following years. Today, there are at least seven 
commercial agencies and around twenty independ-
ent tourist guides offering tours to various favelas 
in Rio, and approximately 50,000 Rio tourists take 
advantage of their offers annually ─ and an upward 
trend can be observed (Steinbrink et al. 2012b: 5). 
In the early phase of this development the ‘tourist 
gaze’ (Urry 2002) was a politicised gaze charged with 
politico-moral outrage and, as a rule, combined with 
a more or less openly accusatory side glance at ‘the 
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system’ and at ‘the political class’. Favelas were re-
garded as a social and political problem, as places of 
oppression, exclusion and exploitation. Meanwhile, 
in the course of commercialisation and profession-
alisation of favela tourism, political concerns have 
shifted to the background. The main focus today is 
firstly, on cultural matters and on the mode of life in 
the favelas, and secondly and particularly on issues 
of violence and drugs-related crime. One of the larg-
est professional tour companies (Be a Local – don’t 
be a Gringo) has particularly been making much use 
of the kick that adrenaline delivers: During a guided 
tour in October 2011, in which the author also par-
ticipated, the group came across five heavily armed 
youngsters. The tour guide first shouted: “No photo! 
No photo!” After the boys had passed, he added: “Hey, 
you are lucky! You don’t see that every day!” He made 
the same statement 30 minutes later when a coffin 
was carried towards the tourist group. 
At least until the pacification of Rocinha in Novem-
ber 2011, crime and drug war were unmistakably the 
central topics and gang members carrying assault ri-
fles were the major attraction of the tours. Besides, 
the tours of Be-a-Local are explicitly guided through 
parts of Rocinha which, both optically and olfactorily, 
appear extremely run down and dirty. In a bid to meet 
the expectations of international tourists private tour 
companies tend to draw on certain daunting as well 
as thrilling aspects of the favela imaginations dis-
seminated by the media (cf. Frisch 2012). It is obvious 
that such tours hardly serve the purpose of positively 
changing this image; the hitherto common mode of 
representation rather reproduces the stereotypes 
which are supposed to be overcome.
If favela tourism is to be valorised in terms of the 
festivalisation paradigm, then the favelas will defi-
nitely need to be staged differently. The City of Rio 
therefore decided to play an active role in favela 
tourism. In May 2010, the programme Rio Top Tour 
initiated by the Ministry of Tourism, Sports and Lei-
sure and TourisRio, the urban tourism agency, was 
brought into existence. The aim is to develop touris-
tic structures in pacified favelas. The programme’s 
pilot project started in Santa Marta, with an invest-
ment volume of US$ 145,000 (Bruns 2011). Canta-
galo and Providência (see above) are also among the 
areas covered by the programme. The fact that the 
then president Lula da Silva personally inaugurated 
the programme is a clear evidence of the political 
importance attached to favela tourism.
For the project in Santa Marta, tourist maps were pro-
duced, bilingual signposts and information boards 
installed, local tour guides trained, and micro-loans 
made available for businesses interested in tourism. 
The tourist attractions advertised in the favela include 
the ‘Favela Painting’ art project (see above), the local 
samba school, stalls of local artisans and a look-out 
point with a statue of Michael Jackson, who shot the 
video for his famous song ‘They don’t care about us’ in 
Santa Marta (see Medeiros and Menezes in this volume 
for details). In addition, the newly established UPP sta-
tion is also marked as a tourist sight by a plaque ex-
plaining the official idea of pacification. 
It has been publicly emphasised that Rio Top Tour cre-
ates jobs and therefore serves the purpose of poverty 
reduction (‘pro-poor tourism’), and that it addition-
ally strengthens socio-economic and socio-cultural 
participation (‘community-based tourism’). It is pro-
claimed that favela tourism is a tool for development.
Irrespective of the actual socio-economic effects of 
this programme, it is a means to internationally dem-
onstrate the government’s will and ability to tackle 
urban poverty. The promotion of favela tourism can 
thus be interpreted as a symbolic political gesture. 
By guiding the tourists to pacified and spruced up 
showcase favelas, the public attention is directed 
to those areas in which the state has become active 
regarding security and social policies. The formerly 
accusing side glance at the state becomes an appre-
ciating look as the role of the government becomes 
re-interpreted. The state is no longer an opponent of 
the ‘favelados’, but their supporter. Pacification it-
self becomes an attraction of favela tours, since the 
tourists are now presented with the achievements 
of security policy as well as of governmental social 
and infrastructural projects. The Brazilian state 
now displays itself as a socio-political caretaker.
Moreover, the selective direction of the tourist gaze 
diverts it from the numerous forgotten favelas at 
the periphery (invisibilisation), as well as from the 
demolition and eviction measures (invisibilisation 
of invisibilisation measures).
By engaging in favela tours, the state actively tries 
to transmit a differently composed picture and to 
show the favelas ‘from a new point of view’ (cf. logo 
of Rio Top Tour; Fig. 5). The colourful and pleasant 
aspects of the favela are moved to the foreground, 
which contrasts with what is usually emphasised in 
most of the established favela tours.
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The co-ordinator of the programme, Monica Rodri-
gues, emphasises:
“We want to show that Brazil doesn’t just have he-
reditary culture. Here there are samba and capoeira 
groups, northeastern traditions, typical cuisine, people 
doing trails at night, the stunning viewpoint at the top. 
There exists a community inside the city that needs to 
be discovered by foreigners […]” (cited in Clarke 2010).
The City of Rio makes use of a general tendency that 
can be observed in global slum tourism. The study by 
Rolfes et al. (2009) in Cape Town and those by Mesch-
kank (2012) and Dyson (2012) in Mumbai reveal that 
slum tours have a strong capacity to change negative 
perceptions of slums (cf. Rolfes and Meschkank in this 
volume). The findings of the study by Medeiros and Me-
nezes (in this volume), which adopts a method close to 
that of Rolfes et al. (2009), prove that the favela tourism 
in Santa Marta does indeed indicate a positive change 
as well. Hence the governmental promotion of favela 
tourism seems to achieve its transformative aim.
The way Santa Marta is represented by Rio Top Tour 
involves a specific form of culturalisation which aims 
at a recharging of spatial semantics or in other words 
at a ‘rebranding’ of the global trademark ‘favela’. This 
culturalising representation goes hand in hand with 
a shift in ascribed responsibility. The living condi-
tions in the favelas are no longer observed as an ex-
pression of social injustice, but as one of local char-
acter and of a typical Brazilian way of life. In other 
words: Social inequality is deproblematised and the 
tourist gaze is depoliticised. And that is definitely 
good for a happy festival mood of the visitors.
4.  Concluding remarks
The housing and living situation of lower income 
groups probably represents the most sensitive sphere 
regarding the effects of the recent festivalisation 
trend in the Global South. This is not only because the 
public budgets of the host cities are strained by gigan-
tic investments, which also tie up important financial 
resources needed for social housing programmes. Ad-
ditionally, due to the intrinsic logic of festivalisation 
policy the urban poverty areas themselves represent 
a staging problem to be solved before the event starts. 
This paper has shown how Rio de Janeiro is dealing 
with its ‘favela problem’. It has been explained that 
image considerations are an important urban poli-
cy concern. But unlike in previous host cities in the 
Global South, the measures in Rio are not confined 
to the invisibilisation of the signifier. In addition, Rio 
applies strategies of sign transformation, i.e. of the 
reinterpretation or recharging of favela semantics. 
State interventions in this area include both aesthetic 
transformation of the material substrate of the sig-
nifier (building and painting) and touristic staging 
(promotion of favela tourism), which aims at directing 
and diverting the tourist’s gaze. A precondition for the 
implementation of these measures is the pacification 
programme which is simultaneously a strategy of the 
state to present itself in a media-effective manner.
All the projects mentioned in this paper can be seen 
as a ‘symbolic taming’ (Freeman 2012) of the fave-
las and as part of the strategic city-staging of Rio in 
the preparatory phase of two mega-events. The city 
is sprucing itself up and is trying to integrate the 
favelas – at least semantically – into the event city. 
Seen as such, the measures in the favelas seem to be 
designed to mainly serve the outwardly directed ob-
jective of festivalisation policy (image production, 
positioning on the global market etc.).
This, however, is only one possible interpretation. 
The event-related measures can just as well be inter-
preted in line with the inwardly directed objective of 
promoting particular urban development dynamics 
and at the same time as a means serving powerful 
economic interests: For the city, the events constitute 
an opportunity to legitimise certain policies. The im-
mense pressure resulting from the high expectation 
of achieving the national goal of successfully host-
ing the events creates the necessary public accept-
ance and permits a bundling of capacities as well as 
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Fig.5 “Rio de Janeiro from a new point of view” – Official logo of Rio 
Top Tour
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financial resources for measures and strategies which 
would hardly be implementable without the events. 
This applies particularly to the expensive favela paci-
fications. The interests behind the pacification pro-
gramme and also the effects of these measures go far 
beyond the short-term purpose of improving the se-
curity situation in regard to the coming events. The 
regained state control over the favelas not only cre-
ates a secure environment for public infrastructural 
measures and social programmes; it also gives rise to 
attractive conditions for private investments.
Despite the undeniably positive effects for the favela 
residents, the pacification and the follow-on pro-
jects lead to a tremendous rise in the value of land 
and rents and thus, indirectly, to a displacement of 
large parts of the resident population. Increases in 
prices of up to 400 % are being reported from some 
of the pacified favelas (cf. Freeman 2012). 
Moreover, private service companies have seized the 
opportunity to extend their markets areas into the 
pacified favelas. For example, big restaurant and re-
tail chains are setting up branches. Besides, many pri-
vate providers are currently making every effort to 
formalise hitherto informally connected public infra-
structural facilities (such as water, electricity, TV and 
WIFI). It remains to be seen whether and to what ex-
tent the favela residents can meet the additional costs 
(cf. Freeman 2012; Gaffney 2010).
But price increases will not only be experienced within 
the pacified favelas. There are indications that the paci-
fications will also have an immense impact on the for-
mal real estate and housing sectors. In calculations con-
ducted for the whole city, Fischtak and Mandel (2012) 
report that the pacifications are responsible for about 
15 % of the rise in price in the formal housing sector be-
tween mid-2008 and mid-2011. In some residential are-
as directly bordering pacified favelas, real estate prices 
have already doubled (Freeman 2012). This indicates 
that the pacifications will further open the door to the 
already flourishing speculative business. We can thus 
assume that in the foreseeable future, gentrification 
will occur. Medium-income households will move from 
formal areas into the pacified favelas; and so pressure 
due to rent increases will be intensified and will lead to 
the moving out of favela residents.
The example of the pacification programme illustrates 
how the city of Rio uses the coming mega-events to 
achieve certain policy goals. And I mean neither 
the reduction of crime rates in the city nor the fight 
against urban poverty; for both will presumably only 
shift to the periphery. Rather, with these measures, 
the state will make it possible for the ‘invisible hand 
of the free market’ to take hold on certain highly at-
tractive areas, which so far have been ‘no-go areas’ for 
investors and which have to a certain extent remained 
outside the sphere of formal economic valorisation. 
The urban policy strategies described in this paper 
are not only orientated towards the short-term re-
quirements of mega-events. The market-orientated in-
terventions of the state must instead be placed in the 
context of Harvey’s notion of ‘accumulation by dispos-session’ (Harvey 2003; Harvey 2004): By opening up 
new lucrative market areas the state almost directly 
serves the interests of capitalist accumulation (espe-
cially those of the real estate sector). The neoliberal 
orientation of festifavelisation policy is just as visible 
as are its far reaching implications for the urban poor.
Notes
1 The importance attached to a solution to the ‘favela problem’ 
from a political point of view can be inferred from the im-
mense costs involved in the pacification programme. In late 
2011, there were 3771 UPP police officers; this number im-
plies an annual expenditure of 230 million Reais (Brazilian 
Real = BRL; roughly US$ 113 million). Considering the total of 
100 UPPs currently being planned to be set up by the start of 
the Olympic Games in 2016, this would imply projected annual 
costs of BRL 1.8 billion from 2016. In view of the state annual 
security budget of BRL 5 billion in 2010, we can appreciate the 
extent of the financial burden (Freeman 2012). 2 Rio’s language policy is also interesting in this connection. There 
are bilingual signboards for visitors on the tower platform, pro-
viding information on the surrounding sights; they also draw 
attention to other favelas. But here, too, the word ‘favela’ is 
avoided and the term ‘community‘ is used instead. This is again 
a language-policy expression of the invisibilisation strategy. In 
a personal communication Jim Freeman shared an interesting 
observation with me: “I have been noticing increasingly that ‘co-
munidade’ is starting to take on the same negative connotations 
as ‘favela’. People use it ironically. One middle-class acquaint-
ance of mine was criticising the way favela girls dressed and 
spoke disdainfully about a girl’s very tight and short ‘shortinho 
communidade’, her ‘community shorts’. A real estate agent I was 
interviewing went on and on about the negative effect of com-
munidades and views of communidades on real estate values.’3 For a completely different reading of the arts project see Kosmala 
and Imas (2012).
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